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Abstract
This paper empirically assesses the potential nonlinear relationship be-
tween competition and bank risk for a sample of commercial banks in the
Baltic countries over the period 2000-2014. Competition is measured by
two alternative indexes, the Lerner index and the market share, while we
consider the Z-score and loan loss reserves as proxies for bank risk. In line
with the theoretical predictions of Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), we
find an inverse U-shaped relationship between competition and financial
stability. This then means that above a certain threshold, the lack of
competition is likely to exacerbate the individual risk-taking behaviour of
banks, and could be detrimental to the stability of the banking sector in
the Baltic countries. The threshold is around 0.60 for the Lerner index,
and close to 50% for market share in terms of assets. The policy implica-
tions are that the existence of such a threshold suggests that the future
evolution of the structure of the banking industry in these countries is of
critical importance. Specifically, this implies that policy-makers should
place greater emphasis on mergers and acquisitions to avoid any signifi-
cant increase of banking sector concentration.
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1 Introduction
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the US in 2008, and the consequent
need for a number of European banks to be bailed out, there has been concern re-
cently about the relationship between banking sector concentration and financial
stability within a country.
A number of studies have attempted to answer whether highly concentrated
banking markets have an impact on financial stability. However, the results are
far from conclusive since they vary with the period and countries analysed. The
importance of a healthy banking sector for the successful functioning of an econ-
omy makes this subject topical for academics and policy-making institutions
alike. Proper analysis of the degree of causality from banking concentration
to banking sector stability can help institutions deploy the right measures to
enhance stability, while it is a priority for academics to investigate how to mea-
sure banking competition and financial stability, and how to help policy-making
promote stability and economic growth. Basic industrial organisation theory as-
sumes that competition in markets tends to reduce the prices paid by consumers
and increases efficiency, as only the most efficient firms could survive in a perfect
competitive market. However, this prevailing assumption might be misguided
for the banking sector, since fierce competition among banks can result in in-
creased instability in the banking sector, leading to a financial crisis with fatal
consequences for the banks. In this scenario, pro-competition policies that are
targeted to enhance the efficiency of the financial sector might have strong ad-
verse effects for the whole economy. Whether they do or not depends on whether
tight competition enhances or reduces financial stability. The empirical literature
does not provide a clear answer to this question, and theoretical papers do not
reach a consensus either. This highlights the importance of establishing what the
effect of bank competition on the risk-taking behaviour of financial institutions
is, and then what its effect on financial stability is.
The literature offers two opposing views of the relationship between com-
petition in the banking sector and financial stability (see, for instance, Beck,
2008). These views are the traditional “competition-fragility” view, and the
“competition-stability” view.
The competition-fragility view argues that high levels of competition in the
banking sector may increase financial instability and the fragility of banks. In a
highly competitive banking sector, bank managers may have an incentive to take
on high-risk operations in the search to make big profits quickly to meet profit
objectives. This may lead them to put together a riskier portfolio of assets, which
may end up in bankruptcies if there is a case of financial distress (see Keeley,
1990 amongst others for a theoretical model). In contrast, a less competitive
environment where banks can afford higher capital buffers and less aggressive
operations means the incentive to take increased unnecessary risk diminishes,
enhancing the stability of the banking sector overall. Bergantino and Capozza
(2013) say that bigger banks can afford to give low interest rates to new start-ups
and share future profits. In addition, it is easier for the financial authorities to
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monitor a banking sector with fewer and bigger banks. Finally, bigger banks
with a higher level of market concentration can access better conditions in inter-
national markets than they can find in domestic ones, making them able to lend
more cheaply and reducing the cost of capital for firms and households (Beck
et al., 2006).
The competition-stability view claims, on the contrary, that if a reduced
number of banks have greater market power, it may increase the risks to their
portfolios, as they will tend to set higher margins on loan interest rates. In this
case, clients will have to pay a higher cost for borrowing, which may make non-
performing loans more likely to increase in number. Linked to this, increased
competition may affect the cost of capital, giving firms and individuals access to
lower interest rates, which would boost the profitability of investment projects,
thus reducing credit risks and ultimately enhancing financial stability. In addi-
tion, big banks may believe that they are “too big to fail”, which comes from
the moral hazard effect of the authorities providing bailouts when problems arise
(Mishkin, 1999). In this case a lack of competition may give banks an incentive
to engage in riskier operations.
Our analysis in this paper focuses on the relationship between the competi-
tion and concentration in the banking sector and financial stability in the Baltic
countries, which are Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Baltic countries are a
textbook example of an area with a highly concentrated banking sector, with a
small number of large, mostly foreign, banks. In figure 1 we illustrate the share of
assets held by the three largest banks in the Baltic countries and in other Central
and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). Estonia and Lithuania stand out for
the high degree of concentration in their banking sectors, as it is significantly
higher than in Latvia or the other CEECs. The three largest banks in Lithuania
had around 80% of total banking-sector assets in 2013, and in Estonia the three
largest had more than 96%. Most of the larger financial institutions in Esto-
nia, Latvia, and Lithuania are Nordic banks. This high level of banking sector
concentration in the Baltic countries is a result of privatisation and mergers fol-
lowing the banking crises in Estonia (1992-1994), Latvia (1995) and Lithuania
(1995-1996). During this period, some banks were liquidated, while others were
recapitalised, and the primary outcome was that the Baltic banking sector has
become highly concentrated and largely foreign-owned because the governments
encouraged bank mergers and foreign takeovers for fear of bank runs and credit
contraction.
Since the empirical literature does not seem to provide a clear answer as to
which view holds empirically, this paper addresses this well-worn debate for this
group of countries. Understanding whether the high concentration levels in the
banking sector in the Baltic countries affect the risk-taking behaviour of banks,
and consequently the stability of the banking sector, is of key importance for
regulation and competition policies.
This paper investigates empirically at bank level the relationship between
competition and risk for a sample of forty commercial banks in the Baltic coun-
tries from 2000 to 2014. Rather than simply analysing the potential trade-off
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Figure 1: Concentration of banking sector assets: Baltic countries and other
CEECs
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between competition and financial stability in a linear fashion though, we follow
the recent theoretical predictions from Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), and
allow for the possibility of an inverse U-shaped relationship between competition
and financial stability. The most recent literature on banking sector competition
and concentration and financial stability highlights the importance of account-
ing for a U-shaped relationship between both measures. Doing so could let us
identify an optimal degree of concentration and competition, and may indicate
that both the competition-stability and the competition-fragility views are ap-
propriate, depending on the level of concentration and competition1.
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) establish that there may indeed be two
separate effects in operation. One is the risk-shifting effect found by Boyd and
De Nicoló (2005) where risk is reduced as competition increases, provided that
there is a negative correlation between loan interest rates and competition, as
this reduces the risk of loan defaults. The second effect is the margin effect, which
implies that greater bank competition reduces interest payments, reducing the
buffer against losses. According to Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) the risk-
shifting effect dominates in less competitive banking markets, so the marginal
effect of a new bank entry is negative for financial stability, whereas in more
competitive markets the margin effect overwhelms the risk-shifting effect, so a
1See, for instance, Berger et al. (2009), Fungáčová and Weill (2013), Jimenez et al. (2013),
Liu et al. (2013), and Fu et al. (2014).
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new entry increases financial risk.
In the empirical literature, U-shaped relationships are usually tested by in-
cluding a quadratic term in a standard regression model. If the estimated co-
efficient associated with this term is statistically significant and the estimated
extremum point is within the data range, then it is common to conclude that
there is a U-shaped relationship. In our paper, we go a step further and test
the existence of a U-shaped relationship between bank competition and financial
stability formally with the U-shape test developed by Lind and Mehlum (2010).
This procedure also gives us a confidence interval for the optimal point. Such
a confidence interval can be very useful for policy making, as it lets the regu-
latory authorities assess whether any financial institution has passed the upper
bound, given the existence of a U-shaped relationship. It can be particularly
useful for assessing whether the entry of new financial institutions or mergers
could exacerbate financial instability.
We do this using balance-sheet data taken from the Bankscope database and
we consider two types of bank risk proxy, the Z-score and the loan loss reserves.
We also consider two different measures of competition, a structural measure
derived from market share, and a non-structural measure from the Lerner index.
As we will show in this paper, these two alternative measures of banking com-
petition are not necessarily highly correlated, and they seem to capture different
aspects of competition.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the the-
oretical and empirical literature the on link between banking competition and
financial (in)stability. Section 3 presents the data and the measures of competi-
tion and bank risk used. Section 4 presents the methodology and discusses the
results. A battery of robustness checks is conducted in section 5, and section 6
concludes.
2 Literature review
This section summarises the literature on the issue analysed here of competi-
tion and concentration in the banking sector and financial stability. There is
some controversy about whether measures of market concentration can be taken
as proxies for market competition and vice versa. In this regard the empiri-
cal contributions seem to confirm that there is an inverse relationship between
competition and concentration as concentration impairs competitiveness (see,
e.g. Bikker and Haaf, 2002 or Gutiérrez de Rozas, 2007). However, as the next
section details, this paper considers different proxies for the two measures.
As mentioned in the introduction, there are two main views on reconciling the
relationship between competition and concentration and financial stability. The
competition-stability hypothesis has its origins in the paper by Mishkin (1999),
where it is hypothesised that a bank considering itself too big to fail would have
increased incentives to take on riskier assets than otherwise as the government
would in any case bail it out if it runs into trouble. This is the moral hazard
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problem. In this case, the government, or more accurately the taxpayer, bears
the risk of the bank. In relation to this, Caminal and Matutes (2002) show that
reduced competition can result in reduced credit rationing and larger loans, with
a consequent increase in the probability of bank failures. In a seminal contri-
bution Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) claim that a highly concentrated banking
system allows banks to impose higher margins and hence higher borrowing rates
for their clients. In this situation, corporate clients may be more inclined to en-
gage in riskier projects seeking high and rapid returns, increasing the probability
of failures.
On the other hand, the competition-fragility viewpoint states that more com-
petitive or less concentrated banking systems may be more fragile. Marcus (1984)
argues that the decline in franchise value caused by competition drives banks
more towards risk-taking strategies because the opportunity cost of bankruptcy
decreases. Furthermore, Boot and Greenbaum (1993) claim that banks extract
less informational rent from borrowers in a more competitive environment, and
this reduces their incentive to screen borrowers properly. In addition, Allen and
Gale (2000) find that a concentrated banking market is more stable because it is
easier for the supervisory authority to monitor banks. Finally, Boyd et al. (2006)
point out that higher profits in highly concentrated banking systems may reduce
financial fragility as they provide higher capital buffers.
Given the current policy relevance of the topic and the conflicting theoreti-
cal predictions, a number of empirical papers have investigated the relationship
between banking sector competition and concentration and financial stability.
However, the empirical findings do not all lead to the same conclusion. Indeed,
while some cross-country analyses (see, for instance, Beck et al., 2006) argue
that banking crises are less likely in economies with more concentrated banking
systems, others show on the contrary that competitive banking sectors are less
prone to systemic banking crises and exhibit increased time to crisis (see, for in-
stance, Schaeck et al., 2009).The recent empirical investigation by Diallo (2015)
seems to support the competition-fragility view, as it considers a large sample
of emerging and industrial economies and uses different measures of bank com-
petition and finds the opposite results to those of Schaeck et al. (2009). Diallo
(2015) shows that bank competition increases the probability of a systemic bank-
ing crisis occurring and that it is also positively related to the duration of the
crisis.
More recent evidence from studies with a European perspective also offers
mixed results. The first paper to study the link between banking sector concen-
tration and financial stability in Europe is that of Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009).
They use an aggregate z-score as a measure of banking sector fragility for 25
European countries and show that banking market concentration that has a sig-
nificant negative effect on financial stability. Their results suggest this negative
relationship between concentration and stability may be explained by the higher
volatility of the returns of larger banks in concentrated markets. In a recent pa-
per, IJtsma et al. (2017) re-investigate this issue for the same sample of countries,
but unlike Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009), they analyse them at both country level
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and bank level. Indeed, they show that if returns on assets of the banks are not
perfectly correlated, the aggregated and bank-level z-scores measure different as-
pects of financial stability. Notably, the aggregate z-score accounts for systemic
risk. In line with Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009), the results that they obtain sug-
gest that concentration has a significant negative effect on stability. However,
their findings also indicate that this effect is economically small at both levels of
analysis. A similar result is obtained by Cifter (2015) for Central and Eastern
European Countries (CEECs), as no robust relationship is found between bank
concentration and non-performing loans.
Finally, a focus on empirical studies that investigate the competition-stability
nexus using bank-level data also finds conflicting results2. For instance, results
obtained by Agoraki et al. (2011) for a sample of CEECs suggest that a weak
competitive environment is not necessarily synonymous with financial instability.
Indeed, they find that banks with relatively high market power tend to take
on lower credit risk and have a lower probability of default. The opposite is
found by Schaeck and Čihák (2014), who show that competition in the banking
sector enhances financial stability. They say that efficiency is the transmission
mechanism through which competition contributes to stability. Using the Boone
index as a proxy for banking sector competition and considering a large sample
of European banks, Schaeck and Čihák (2014) find that competition is stability-
enhancing, but that this effect of competition on stability is greater for efficient
banks than for inefficient ones.
However, Leroy and Lucotte (2017) show from a large sample of European
listed banks that bank competition can have opposite effects on individual risk
and systemic risk, which they proxy using the SRISK measure. Indeed, the re-
sults that they obtain suggest that competition encourages banks to take risks
and then increases individual bank fragility, but tends to enhance financial sta-
bility by decreasing systemic risk. We also find two further studies for individual
countries in the papers of Kick and Prieto (2015) and Jimenez et al. (2013), who
analyse the relationship between competition and concentration and stability for
the cases of Germany and Spain respectively. In the German case, the authors
find evidence pointing towards the competition-fragility view, while for Spain
nonlinear effects are found, which is in line with the theoretical predictions of
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010).
Although most of the existing literature indicates that the competition-fragility
hypothesis seems to hold empirically, we focus in our paper on the Baltic coun-
tries, which have not been studied much, and where concentration is among the
highest in Europe. In addition, we also look at the potential nonlinear relation-
ship between competition and bank risk.
2See Table A1 in the Appendix for an overview of bank-level analyses on the effect of bank
competition on financial stability.
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3 Data and stylised facts
3.1 Data, measures of competition, concentration and
risk
We consider all the commercial banks in the Baltic countries for which we have
balance-sheet data over the period 2000-2014, giving an unbalanced panel data
of 40 banks. Table 1 shows the list of banks, with their country and the period
available. Our sample contains 21 banks in Latvia, 10 banks in Lithuania, and
9 banks in Estonia. All the data are taken from Bankscope, which is a database
computed by Bureau Van Dijk.
Table 1: List of commercial banks located in the Baltic countries
Bank Name Country code Period Bank Name Country code Period
Swedbank ASsub LV 2001-2014 Swedbank ASsub EE 2000-2014
ABLV Bank AScor LV 2002-2014 SEB Panksub EE 2000-2014
SEB banka ASsub LV 2000-2014 Danske Bank A/S Estonia Branchbra EE 2000-2007
Rietumu Bank Group-Rietumu Bankacor LV 2000-2014 DNB Pank ASsin EE 2011-2014
AS Citadele Bankasub LV 2010-2014 AS LHV Panksub EE 2012-2014
AS DnB Bankasub LV 2004-2014 BIGBANK AScor EE 2006-2014
Norvik Banka ASsub LV 2006-2014 Estonian Credit Bank-Eesti Krediiidipanksub EE 2000-2014
Latvijas Kraj Banka AS-Latvian Savings Banksub LV 2005-2010 Versobank ASsub EE 2011-2014
As PrivatBanksub LV 2004-2014 Tallinn Business Bank Ltd-Tallinna Äripanga AScor EE 2010-2013
Baltikum Bank ASsub LV 2005-2014 AB SEB Bankassub LT 2000-2014
Regionala investiciju banka-Regional Investment Banksub LV 2003-2014 Swedbank ABsub LT 2003-2014
Trasta Komercbanka-Trust Commercial Bankcor LV 2000-2014 AB DNB Bankassub LT 2000-2014
Baltic International Bank- Baltijas Starptautiska Bankasub LV 2009-2014 AB Bankas Snoraside LT 2000-2010
AS Expobankbra LV 2012-2014 Danske Bank A/Sbra LT 2000-2014
Danske Bank A/Ssub LV 2000-2007 Siauliu Bankascor LT 2000-2014
Jsc Latvian Development Financial Institution Altumsin LV 2003-2013 Citadele Bankas ABsub LT 2006-2014
Meridian Trade Bank ASind LV 2003-2014 UAB Medicinos Bankassub LT 2000-2014
AS Revertasub LV 2000-2014 AB Bankas FINASTAsub LT 2009-2014
Bank M2M Europe ASsub LV 2005-2009, 2013-2014 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB; Vilniaus Filialiasin LT 2009-2014
JSC Latvijas Pasta bankasub LV 2009-2014
GE Capital Latviasub LV 2004-2012
Source: Bankscope. Type of Bank entity: sub - controlled subsidiary, cor - corporate group, bra -
branch, sin - single location , ind - independent , ide - not identified
Since our analysis aims to investigate the relationship between banking com-
petition and risk-taking by banks, we first need to choose a bank-level measure
of competition. As Northcott (2004) argued however, there is no consensus
in the literature about the best indicator for gauging competition. The litera-
ture traditionally distinguishes two types of measure of competition, these being
structural and non-structural measures. Structural measures come within the
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm, which was initially developed
by Mason (1939) and Bain (1959), and they are based on the assumption that
the competitive behaviour of banks is principally determined by the structural
characteristics of the market in which they operate, such as the degree of market
concentration. In this paradigm, a concentrated market structure is associated
with higher prices and profits, reflecting uncompetitive behaviour by firms. This
paradigm has been criticised however, because higher profits in the banking sec-
tor could also be the result of greater production and managerial efficiency, as
shown for example by Smirlock (1985), Evanoff and Fortier (1988), and Berger
(1995) for the US banking sector.
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Criticisms of the SCP paradigm have led a number of recent studies to prefer
non-structural competition measures for analysing the competitive features of
the banking industry. These measures lie within the New Empirical Industrial
Organisation framework and compare some form of price mark-up against a com-
petitive benchmark, with a higher mark-up reflecting greater market power and
a less competitive environment. A variety of non-structural measures of compe-
tition have been developed in the academic literature. The two best-known of
them are probably the Lerner index (Lerner, 1934) and the H-statistic developed
by Panzar and Rosse (1987). More recently, Boone (2008) extended the existing
set of non-structural competition measures by proposing a macro-level index of
competition. This index draws on the idea that more efficient firms achieve su-
perior performance in higher profits or larger market shares, and that this effect
is stronger the heavier the competition is. The main advantage of non-structural
measures of competition over structural indicators is that they are micro-founded
and therefore offer a more realistic setting for estimating competitive conditions
in the banking sector.
A number of studies compare the structural and non-structural measures of
competition for the banking sector and investigate their relationships empiri-
cally. One of the first studies on this issue was conducted by Bikker and Haaf
(2002). They consider a large sample of banks from twenty-three European and
non-European countries and compute the H-statistic and regress it on different
measures of banking sector concentration, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman In-
dex (HHI). Their results are in line with the SCP paradigm and provide evidence
that concentration impairs competitiveness. Extending the sample of countries
however, Claessens and Laeven (2004) find opposite results, and do not find the
expected negative relationship between banking sector concentration and the
H-statistic. On the contrary, they find a positive and statistically significant
relationship, suggesting that banks operating in more concentrated sectors face
a greater degree of competition. In a similar way, Carbó et al. (2009) assess the
relative competitive position of banking markets in fourteen European countries
by focusing on different structural and non-structural measures of competition.
Like Bikker and Haaf (2002), they do not find a high correlation between the
Lerner index and the HHI structural measure. More generally, they show that
the existing indicators of competition give conflicting predictions across countries,
within countries, and over time, even if they seem to provide similar rankings.
Similar results are obtained by Lapteacru (2014) for the Central and Eastern
European Countries (CEECs), finding relatively low pair-wise correlations be-
tween the three measures of competition considered, the HHI, the Lerner index,
and the H-statistic. As argued by Carbó et al. (2009), a cause of the divergence
between competition indicators could be that they tend to measure different
aspects and are additionally influenced by cross-country differences in cost effi-
ciency, fee income levels, real economic growth and inflation. This divergence
may also explain why the majority of empirical studies in the banking literature
often use only one measure of competition, structural or non-structural.
Against this background, and given the large debate in the literature con-
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cerning the reliability of these measures of competition, we adopt a conservative
approach and choose to use both a structural measure of bank-level competition
and a non-structural one. The structural measure we consider is market share,
and the non-structural measure is the Lerner index. The market share corre-
sponds to the amount of assets held by each bank divided by the total assets
of the national banking sector. This ratio of between 0 and 100% is positively
related to the degree of market concentration, so in the SCP paradigm it is an
inverse proxy for bank competition, meaning that a low value indicates a high
degree of competition and vice versa.
The Lerner index is also an inverse proxy for competition. It is designed to
measure the pricing power of firms and corresponds to the mark-up of price over
marginal cost. The Lerner index is bounded between 0 and 1, with the extreme
value of zero corresponding to perfect competition, and the value of one to a
pure monopoly. As stated by Leroy and Lucotte (2017), the main advantage of
the Lerner index is that it is the only time-varying non-structural measure of
competition that can be computed at the disaggregated level of the firm. This
certainly explains why the Lerner index has been used as a proxy for firm-level
competition by a number of recent empirical studies in the banking literature
(see table A1 in the Appendix).
Formally, the Lerner index corresponds to the difference between price and
marginal cost as a percentage of price. It can be written as follows:
Lernerit =
pit −mcit
pit
(1)
with pit the price and mcit the marginal cost for the bank i in period t. Under
the assumption that the heterogeneous flow of services produced by a bank is
proportional to its total assets, the price pit is calculated as the ratio of total
revenue (the sum of interest and non-interest income) to total assets.
To obtain the marginal cost, we adopt an approach that is conventional in the
literature (see, e.g., Berger et al., 2009 or Beck et al., 2013) and model the total
operating cost of running the bank as a function of a single, aggregate output
proxy, Qit, and three input prices, W1,it, W2,it, and W3,it. More precisely, we
estimate the following translog cost function:
lnCit = β0 + β1lnQit +
β2
2 lnQ
2
it +
3∑
k=1
γklnWk,it +
3∑
k=1
φklnQitlnWk,it
+
3∑
k=1
3∑
j=1
ρkj
2 lnWk,itlnWj,it + δ1T +
δ2
2 T
2 + δ3T lnQit +
6∑
k=4
δkT lnWk,it + εit (2)
in which Cit measures the total operating costs from interest expenses, personnel
costs, and other administrative and operating costs for bank i at the period t, and
Qit represents a proxy for bank output and corresponds to the total assets. W1,it,
W2,it and W3,it are the prices of inputs. W1,it is the ratio of interest expenses to
total assets,W2,it is the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets, andW3,it is the
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ratio of administrative and other operating expenses to total assets. T is a trend
that is included to capture technical changes and potential movements in the cost
function over time. Furthermore, to reduce the influence of outliers, all variables
are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile levels (see, e.g., Berger et al., 2009
or Anginer et al., 2014). Following Turk-Ariss (2010) and Liu et al. (2013), we
also scale cost and input prices by W3 to correct for heteroscedasticity and scale
biases. We further impose the following restrictions on regression coefficients to
ensure homogeneity of degree one in input prices: ∑3k=1 γk,t = 1, ∑3k=1 φk = 0
and ∑3k=1∑3j=1 ρk = 0.
Because there are a relatively low number of observations, the equation (2) is
not estimated separately for each Baltic country. We estimate the translog cost
function on the whole sample of commercial banks in the Baltic countries, and we
include country fixed effects in the regression to control for potential differences
in technology across economies. The coefficient estimates from equation (2) are
then used to calculate the marginal cost for each bank i at each period t:
mcit =
∂Cit
∂Qit
= Cit
Qit
(
βˆ1 + βˆ2lnQit +
3∑
k=1
θˆklnWk,it + δˆ3T
)
(3)
However, as argued by Turk-Ariss (2010), one important problem associated
with the estimation of the conventional Lerner index is that it implicitly assumes
full bank efficiency and does not consider the possibility that banks may not
exploit the pricing opportunities that result from market power. Indeed, banks
with a large amount of market power could choose the quiet life and reduce
their cost efficiency (Hicks, 1935 or Berger and Hannan, 1998)3. Alternatively,
efficiency could also lead to the market being concentrated in the hands of the
most efficient banks (Demsetz, 1973; Peltzman, 1977). Consequently, as shown
by Koetter et al. (2012), not controlling for inefficiency is problematic because
it can affect the difference between price and marginal cost, and this then biases
the estimation of the Lerner index.
We account for this bias by not proxying the market power of banks using
the conventional Lerner index, but instead by considering the efficiency-adjusted
Lerner index proposed by Koetter et al. (2012), defined as:
AdjustedLernerit =
(pˆiit + Cˆit)− mˆcit
(pˆiit + Cˆit)
(4)
where pˆiit is the estimated profit, Cˆit the estimated total cost, and mˆcit the
estimated marginal cost.
To calculate this adjusted Lerner index, we follow Koetter et al. (2012) and
first estimate the translog cost function (equation 2) using a Stochastic Frontier
Analysis (SFA). We then obtain Cˆit and mˆcit. This an approach has the advan-
tage of taking into account banks’ cost inefficiency, defined as the distance of
3Note nonetheless that empirical results obtained by Maudos and de Guevara (2007) for
a large sample of European banks do not confirm the quiet life hypothesis. On the contrary,
they find a positive relationship between market power and the cost X-efficiency.
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a bank from a cost frontier accepted as the benchmark. Second, we specify an
alternative profit function (Berger and Hannan, 1998), that we estimate using a
SFA to obtain pˆiit.
Finally, we consider two alternative proxies for measures of bank risk: the
Z-score and the loan loss reserves as a percentage of gross loans. The loan
loss reserves are a measure of credit risk, while the Z-score is a commonly-used
accounting-based measure of bank stability. The Z-score explicitly compares the
buffers of capitalisation and returns with risk from the volatility of returns to
measure how far a bank is from insolvency. It is defined as:
Zscoreit =
Eit/Ait + µROAit
σROAit
(5)
where µROAit is the expected return on assets, Eit/Ait is the equity to total assets
ratio, and σROAit is the standard deviation of the return on assets.
The Z-score is inversely related to the probability of a bank becoming insol-
vent. A higher Z-score implies a lower probability of this happening. Because
a bank becomes insolvent when the value of its assets drops below that of its
debt, the Z-score can be interpreted as the number of standard deviations that a
bank’s return must fall below its expected value by to wipe out all the equity in
the bank and render it insolvent (Boyd and Runkle, 1993). This study opts for
the approach used by Beck et al. (2013) to compute the standard deviation of
ROA4. This approach uses a three-year rolling time window to compute the stan-
dard deviation of ROA rather than the full sample period, whereas the return
on assets and the equity to total assets ratio are contemporaneous. As argued
by Beck et al. (2013), this approach has two main advantages. First, it avoids
the variation in the Z-score within banks that is exclusively driven over time
by variation in the levels of capital and profitability. Second, given the unbal-
anced nature of our panel dataset, it avoids the denominator being computed at
different window lengths for different banks.
3.2 Stylised facts
Before turning to the econometric analysis, we present the main cross-sectional
and times series features of the Lerner index and the market share variable, and
analyse whether they are linked to our proxies for bank risk. Table 2 reports the
mean of the Lerner index and the bank market share for the Baltic countries for
different sub-periods and for the overall period. We can observe in all the Baltic
countries that the market power of commercial banks seems to have decreased
between 2000 and 2014. This evolution is the most pronounced for Latvia, where
the average of the Lerner index went from 0.72 in 2000-04 to 0.33 in 2010-14,
and the average market share went from 13.73% in 2000-04 to 5.63% in 2010-14.
We find that, in any case, Estonia is the Baltic country with the highest values
4See Lepetit and Strobel (2013) for a review of different methodologies for computing the
Z-score.
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for the Lerner index and the bank market share, which is consistent with the
findings reported in figure 1.
Table 2: Evolution of the Lerner index and the market share in Baltic countries
Lerner index (mean) Market share in% (mean)
Sub-periods Estonia Lithuania Latvia Estonia Lithuania Latvia
2000-2004 0.652 0.512 0.716 25.00 15.718 13.73
2005-2009 0.608 0.428 0.532 22.95 12.358 5.964
2010-2014 0.562 0.35 0.334 14.268 10.888 5.628
Overall period
2000-2014 0.6 0.41 0.48 19.26 12.61 7.01
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the Bankscope database. Note: The Lerner index
refers to the adjusted Lerner index proposed by Koetter et al. (2012)
In table 3 we report the value of the Lerner index and of the market share
in 2014 for all the commercial banks considered in our sample. For the market
share, we can see that the distribution of activity across banks is relatively more
homogeneous in Latvia than in Lithuania and Estonia. Indeed two banks in
Lithuania, AB SEB Bankas and Swedbank AB, have a market share of more
than 30%, while in Latvia Swedbank AS had the largest market share at 18.75%
in 2014. More importantly, fewer than one quarter of the banks in Latvia had a
market share of more than 10%. In Estonia, the banking industry is dominated
by two foreign banks, SEB Pank and Swedbank AS, which between them hold
nearly 85% of the banking sector assets. Furthermore, these two banks are also
notable for the high values they recorded for the Lerner index in 2014 at 0.90 or
more, which would indicate that our two proxies for market power give similar
patterns. However, the picture for small banks is less clear, since four of them,
AS LHV Pank, DNB Pank AS, Tallinn Business Bank Ltd and Versobank AS,
had a Lerner index above 0.60 in 2014.
The low correlation between our two proxies for market power in Estonia is
confirmed by figure 2. In contrast to the results for Latvia and Lithuania, the
Estonian data suggest a non-significant correlation between market share and
the Lerner index for the Estonian banking sector. This reinforces our decision
to consider two alternative measures of bank market power.
Finally, in figure 3 we plot the Lerner index (x-axis) against the Z-score
and the loan loss reserves (y-axis), while in figure 4 we plot market share (x-
axis) against our alternative measures of bank risk-taking. In each case, we
consider both linear and nonlinear fitted values. The R-squared are obtained by
regressing each measure of risk on the Lerner index or the market share, and by
considering a linear or a quadratic function. The result shows that a relatively
tight relationship exists between the Lerner index and the risk measures, while
the link is less clear when we consider the market share of the banks. This
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relationship is negative with loan loss reserves, and positive with the Z-score,
which is an inverse proxy for bank-individual risk. This preliminary result is
in line with the competition-fragility view. More importantly, bottom scatter
plots reported in figure 3 indicate a potential nonlinear relationship between the
Lerner index and the Z-score, and between the Lerner index and the loan loss
reserves. The next section provides an in-depth assessment of this issue.
Table 3: Lerner index and market share of commercial banks located in Baltic
countries in 2014
Latvia Lithuania Estonia
Lerner index Market share Lerner index Market share Lerner index Market share
ABLV Bank AS 0.76 15.78 AB Bankas FINAST 0.05 0.30 AS LHV Pank 0.61 3.13
AS Citadele Banka 0.66 10.55 AB Bankas Snoras n.a. n.a. BIGBANK AS 0.21 1.88
AS DNB Banka 0.64 8.73 AB DNB Bankas 0.42 17.97 DNB Pank AS 0.68 3.75
AS Expobank 0.61 1.81 AB SEB Bankas 0.73 32.21 Danske Bank A/S n.a. n.a.
AS Reverta -0.04 0.85 Citadele Bankas AB 0.01 2.04 Estonian Credit Bank 0.31 1.48
Baltic International Bank 0.03 1.96 Danske Bank A/S 0.66 8.44 SEB Pank 0.90 30.03
Baltikums Bank AS 0.57 2.31 Siauliu Bankas 0.45 7.83 Swedbank As 0.91 54.00
Bank M2M Europe AS 0.31 0.57 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 0.09 0.01 Tallinn Business Bank Ltd 0.60* 1.12*
Danske Bank A/S n.a. n.a. Swedbank AB 0.71 30.02 Versobank AS 0.65 1.48
GE Capital Latvia 0.01** 0.46** UAB Medicinos Bankas -0.01 1.17
JSC Latvijas Pasa Banka 0.27 0.52
Jsc Latvian Dev. Fin. Inst. Altum -0.01* 1.17*
Latvijas Krajbanka n.a. n.a.
Meridian Trade Bank AS 0.02 0.93
Norvik Banka AS 0.02 4.28
PrivatBank 0.54 2.51
Regionala Investiciju Banka 0.02 2.19
Rietumu Bank Group 0.73 12.86
SEB Banka AS 0.72 13.29
Swedbank AS 0.76 18.75
Trasta Komercbanka 0.01 2.12
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the Bankscope database. Note: The Lerner index
refers to the adjusted Lerner index proposed by Koetter et al. (2012). Due to data availability,
* refers to the Lerner index and the market share in 2013, and ** to the Lerner index and the
market share in 2012. N.A. means that balance sheet data are not available for those years.
4 Methodology and results
Following the theoretical results from Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), we ex-
amine whether nonlinear causality exists between the proxies for concentration
and competition and our alternative measures of risk. To this end, we include
the squared term of the Lerner index or of the market share. Such a nonlin-
ear investigation is useful from a policy point of view, as it allows an optimal
threshold to be identified beyond which bank competition, or inversely a lack
of competition, becomes dangerous for the stability of the banking sector. Our
analysis is based upon the following regression:
riskit = α+β1Compit−1+β2Comp2it−1+β3Crisist+
n∑
k=4
βkXit−1+µi+γt+εit (6)
where i and t are respectively the bank and time period indicators, riskit repre-
sents one or another of our of our measures of risk, Compit−1 represents one or
another of our measures of market power, either the Lerner index or the bank
market share, Crisist is a dummy variable capturing the subprime crisis episode,
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Figure 2: Correlation between the market share and the Lerner index
Note: The Lerner index refers to the adjusted Lerner index proposed by Koetter et al.
(2012).
equal to 1 from 2008 to 2012 and zero otherwise, and Xit−1 is the vector of con-
trol variables. The term µi is an individual specific effect, γt is an unobserved
time effect included to capture common time-varying factors, and εit is the ran-
dom error term. This specification is similar in many ways to that considered by
recent studies that have investigated the competition-stability trade-off (see, for
instance, Leroy and Lucotte, 2017). Equation (6) is estimated using the fixed
effects (FE) estimator.
However, examining whether market power influences risk-taking by banks
raises the question of endogeneity bias. Indeed, Schaeck and Čihák (2008) argued
that the level of risk-taking could affect the competitiveness of banks, which could
then impact our measures of market power. Banks might have an incentive to
gamble in the hope of resurrection when they face a high probability of default.
They may even be more inclined to change the price of their products so as
to access new financial resources and attract new customers, thus affecting the
existing market power. To address this potential endogeneity issue, we lag our
proxies for market power by one period and do the same for all the control
variables. We further consider an instrumental variable approach using the two-
stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. We consider three instrumental variables,
which are the first lag of the market power proxy considered, and two variables
proxying cost inefficiency, these being the ratio of overhead expenses to total
assets and the cost-to-income ratio.
The results obtained are reported in tables 4 and 5 when we consider the
Lerner index as right-hand side variable, and in tables 6 and 7 when we con-
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Figure 3: Scatterplots between the Lerner index and alternative measures of risk
Note: The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval. The Lerner index refers to
the adjusted Lerner index proposed by Koetter et al. (2012).
sider the market share as a proxy for competition. For each specification, we
report the turning point, representing the optimal threshold, when the U-shape
test developed by Lind and Mehlum (2010) indicates a statistically significant
nonlinear relationship between our proxies for bank market power and our alter-
native measures of risk. In this case, we also report the confidence interval for
the extreme point, using the Fieller method5.
Table 4 reveals that the results for each specification show an inverse U-
shaped relationship between the Lerner index and the Z-score. The turning
points vary between 0.57 and 0.64, suggesting that market power tends to in-
crease the fragility of the banking sector beyond this threshold. The results
that we obtain between the Lerner index and loan loss reserves are more mixed.
Indeed, the results reported in table 5 only indicate a U-shaped relationship be-
tween these two variables when we estimate equation (6) using a 2SLS estimator.
In this case, the turning points vary between 0.66 and 0.70.
We do not find a significant nonlinear relationship between the market share
and the Z-score (see table 6). More interestingly, the results reported in table
7 suggest a U-shaped relationship between the market share of the bank and
its loan loss reserves. For each specification, the coefficient estimates associated
with the market share and the interaction term appear statistically significant
at the conventional levels. The turning points vary between 44% and 52%.
Consequently, our nonlinear analysis suggests that a low degree of bank com-
5See Lind and Mehlum (2010) for more details concerning the U-shape test and the com-
putation of the confidence interval.
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Figure 4: Scatterplots between market share and alternative measures of risk
Note: The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval.
petition is likely to exacerbate risk-taking by banks and then be detrimental to
the stability of the banking sector in the Baltic countries. In line with the the-
oretical predictions of Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), we find a very stable
and statistically significant inverse U-shaped relationship between the Lerner in-
dex and the Z-score, a measure of solvency risk. This means that banking sector
fragility is higher in either very competitive or very monopolistic markets, and
lowest when there are moderate levels of competition.
If we now compare each commercial bank in the Baltic countries in 2014 with
the average optimal thresholds for the Lerner index and the market share, we can
see from figure A6 that only one financial institution, Swedbank AS in Estonia,
lies above both threshold values. The situation is more mixed for Lithuania and
Latvia, as a number of banks in Latvia exhibit a Lerner index that is higher than
the optimal threshold but have market shares of between 10% and 20%, which
appears relatively low next to the shares seen in Estonia and Lithuania6.
6A graphical representation of the marginal effects is displayed in figure A5 of the Appendix.
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Table 4: Market power and bank risk-taking: The nonlinear relationship between
the Lerner index and the Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score
FE FE FE 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Lerner 5.014*** 5.031*** 5.056*** 13.924*** 14.067*** 14.922***
(1.102) (1.135) (1.212) (3.490) (3.523) (3.310)
Lerner*Lerner -4.306*** -4.368*** -4.344*** -10.916*** -10.906*** -12.088***
(1.258) (1.327) (1.439) (3.140) (3.218) (3.182)
Inflation 0.033 0.006 -0.027 -0.059
(0.065) (0.063) (0.077) (0.080)
GDP growth -0.027 -0.025 -0.038 -0.021
(0.049) (0.050) (0.056) (0.055)
Crisis dummy -2.743*** -1.263** -1.367 -1.621*** -1.397** -1.529***
(0.438) (0.551) (0.858) (0.462) (0.597) (0.529)
Size 0.023 -0.171
(0.132) (0.215)
Non-interest income/total income -0.577 -0.566
(0.600) (0.919)
Fixed assets/total assets 4.767 3.974
(8.028) (6.083)
Loans/total assets 2.122 2.672
(1.464) (1.723)
Liquidity 0.005 0.007
(0.011) (0.011)
U-shape test 2.30 2.21 2.00 2.44 2.27 2.69
[0.013] [0.016] [0.026] [0.007] [0.011] [0.003]
Turning point 0.582 0.576 0.582 0.638 0.645 0.617
95% confidence interval, Fieller method [0.485 ; 0.862] [0.474 ; 0.889] [0.478 ; 0.983] [0.540 ; 0.838] [0.541 ; 0.877] [0.533 ; 0.789]
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 346 343 343 339
R-squared 0.430 0.431 0.447 0.187 0.171 0.188
Number of banks 40 40 39 40 40 39
Hansen J-OverID test [p-value] - - - 0.0980 0.130 0.162
Note: Constant included but not reported. Robust standard errors clustered at bank level
are reported below their coefficient estimates. The Hansen test evaluates the joint validity of
instruments used. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. The Lerner index refers to the adjusted Lerner index proposed by Koetter et al.
(2012). The U-shape test is based on Lind and Mehlum (2010) and the p-value of the test
statistic is reported between square brackets.
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Table 5: Market power and bank risk-taking: The nonlinear relationship between
the Lerner index and loan loss reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Loan loss Loan loss Loan loss Loan loss Loan loss Loan loss
FE FE FE 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Lerner -28.659 -29.232 -19.250** -59.703*** -58.714*** -51.906***
(17.547) (17.495) (8.709) (21.534) (20.474) (15.712)
Lerner*Lerner 24.365 26.052 13.090 42.663** 42.568** 39.232**
(18.393) (18.689) (9.821) (19.790) (19.187) (15.614)
Inflation -0.774* -0.842* -0.169 -0.102
(0.398) (0.419) (0.309) (0.280)
GDP growth -0.116 -0.036 -0.185 -0.175
(0.124) (0.163) (0.143) (0.138)
Crisis dummy 4.666*** 4.822 13.002 4.593*** 5.824*** 6.439***
(1.391) (4.095) (8.514) (1.608) (2.256) (1.888)
Size -3.585 1.035
(2.901) (1.133)
Non-interest income/total income -3.860* 4.861**
(2.069) (1.955)
Fixed assets/total assets 23.219 19.324
(20.720) (22.169)
Loans/total assets 6.614 -4.208
(10.228) (5.203)
Liquidity 0.036 -0.035
(0.055) (0.023)
U-shape test 1.00 1.11 0.53 1.29 1.33 1.56
[0.162] [0.137] [0.301] [0.099] [0.091] [0.060]
Turning point - - - 0.699 0.689 0.661
95% confidence interval, Fieller method - [0.585 ; 2.478] [0.571 ; 2.057] [0.552 ; 1.321]
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 349 349 349 341 341 341
R-squared 0.462 0.484 0.553 0.035 0.084 0.306
Number of banks 38 38 38 38 38 38
Hansen J-OverID test [p-value] - - - 0.286 0.299 0.215
Note: Constant included but not reported. Robust standard errors clustered at bank level
are reported below their coefficient estimates. The Hansen test evaluates the joint validity of
instruments used. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. The Lerner index refers to the adjusted Lerner index proposed by Koetter et al.
(2012). The U-shape test is based on Lind and Mehlum (2010) and the p-value of the test
statistic is reported between square brackets.
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Table 6: Market power and bank risk-taking: The nonlinear relationship between
the market share and the Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score
FE FE FE 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Market share -0.006 -0.005 0.028 0.005 0.006 0.065
(0.071) (0.068) (0.069) (0.086) (0.084) (0.075)
Market share*Market share 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inflation 0.050 0.012 0.049 0.006
(0.070) (0.065) (0.069) (0.065)
GDP growth -0.048 -0.042 -0.041 -0.037
(0.047) (0.048) (0.044) (0.045)
Crisis dummy -2.121*** -0.263 -0.579 -1.038*** -1.061*** -1.108***
(0.639) (0.793) (1.292) (0.297) (0.405) (0.411)
Size 0.019 -0.070
(0.162) (0.180)
Non-interest income/total income -0.504 -0.558
(0.644) (0.607)
Fixed assets/total assets 3.239 4.030
(9.939) (9.518)
Loans/total assets 3.616* 3.467*
(1.865) (1.796)
Liquidity 0.012 0.012
(0.014) (0.013)
U-shape test 0.09 0.08 Ext. outside Ext. outside Ext. outside Ext. outside
[0.464] [0.47] interval interval interval interval
Turning point - - - - - -
95% confidence interval, Fieller method - - - - - -
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 370 370 366 369 369 365
R-squared 0.329 0.333 0.362 0.330 0.333 0.364
Number of banks 40 40 39 40 40 39
Hansen J-OverID test [p-value] - - - 0.236 0.251 0.178
Note: Constant included but not reported. Robust standard errors clustered at bank level
are reported below their coefficient estimates. The Hansen test evaluates the joint validity of
instruments used. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. The U-shape test is based on Lind and Mehlum (2010) and the p-value of the test
statistic is reported between square brackets. Ext. outside interval means that the extremum
point (i.e. the turning point) is outside the interval, then we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of a monotone relationship.
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Table 7: Market power and bank risk-taking: The nonlinear relationship between
the market share and loan loss reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Loan loss Loan loss Loan loss Loan loss Loan loss Loan loss
FE FE FE 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Market share -1.649** -1.611** -1.557*** -0.798** -0.752** -0.694***
(0.686) (0.676) (0.568) (0.317) (0.310) (0.204)
Market share*Market share 0.016** 0.016** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.007***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Inflation -0.604** -0.679** -0.396* -0.276
(0.286) (0.332) (0.215) (0.203)
GDP growth 0.072 0.053 -0.058 -0.026
(0.158) (0.143) (0.108) (0.098)
Crisis dummy -1.699 -4.874 -1.811 2.296* 3.897** 4.407***
(3.032) (3.352) (4.072) (1.302) (1.602) (1.513)
Size -0.583 0.730
(1.180) (0.687)
Non-interest income/total income -4.438* 5.093**
(2.560) (2.350)
Fixed assets/total assets 16.946 30.684*
(33.153) (16.915)
Loans/total assets -3.592 -4.805
(5.070) (4.134)
Liquidity -0.041 -0.047**
(0.029) (0.022)
U-shape test 2.40 2.36 2.66 2.52 2.43 3.40
[0.010] [0.011] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.000]
Turning point 50.90 51.58 51.50 45.69 47.15 47.21
95% confidence interval, Fieller method [44.48 ; 57.35] [44.68 ; 59.89] [46.16 ; 58.70] [31.89 ; 50.88] [31.54 ; 52.58] [38.04 ; 53.08]
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 368 368 368 365 365 365
R-squared 0.583 0.594 0.608 0.582 0.593 0.633
Number of banks 38 38 38 38 38 38
Hansen J-OverID test [p-value] - - - 0.196 0.194 0.0799
Note: Constant included but not reported. Robust standard errors clustered at bank level
are reported below their coefficient estimates. The Hansen test evaluates the joint validity of
instruments used. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. The U-shape test is based on Lind and Mehlum (2010) and the p-value of the
test statistic is reported between square brackets.
5 Robustness checks
We test the robustness of our results in several ways. First, we consider two
additional proxies for bank risk. Then, following Soedarmono et al. (2011), we
use a Z-score measure based on the return on equity (ZROE). We also replace
the loan loss reserves as a percentage of gross loans with impaired loans as a
percentage of gross loans. The results obtained with these two alternative left-
hand side variables are presented in table 8. To save space, we do not report
the coefficient estimates associated with the control variables, and we only focus
on the results obtained with the FE estimator. Detailed results are available
upon request. The results that we obtain are very similar to those reported
above, and we still find an inverse U-shaped relationship between the Lerner
index and our ZROE measure of bank stability, and a statistically significant
U-shaped relationship between market share and our proxy for credit risk, which
is impaired loans as a percentage of gross loans. Consistent with our previous
findings, the turning points are close to 0.62 for the Lerner index and between
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51% and 54% for the market share.
Table 8: Market power and bank risk-taking: Results obtained with alternative
measures of risk
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable ZROE ZROE ZROE Imp. Loans Imp. Loans Imp. Loans
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Lerner 4.866*** 4.817*** 5.054*** -33.889 -38.433 -22.507*
(1.223) (1.234) (1.308) (23.139) (23.563) (13.142)
Lerner*Lerner -3.930*** -3.874*** -4.020** 19.313 27.620 6.435
(1.372) (1.407) (1.511) (23.235) (24.324) (15.164)
U-shape test 1.77 1.67 1.58 0.16 0.62 Ext. outside
[0.042] [0.051] [0.061] [0.438] [0.27] interval
Turning point 0.619 0.621 0.628 - - -
95% confidence interval, Fieller method [0.500 ; 1.133] [0.498 ; 1.232] [0.504 ; 1.349] - - -
Observations 304 304 299 253 253 253
R-squared 0.428 0.428 0.466 0.479 0.506 0.574
Number of banks 40 40 39 34 34 34
Dependent variable ZROE ZROE ZROE Imp. Loans Imp. Loans Imp. Loans
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Market share -0.022 -0.020 0.036 -2.354** -2.270** -1.918**
(0.058) (0.055) (0.056) (0.944) (0.931) (0.737)
Market share*Market share 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.023** 0.021** 0.018**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
U-shape test 0.37 0.37 Ext. outside 2.49 2.42 2.60
[0.355] [0.356] interval [0.009] [0.010] [0.007]
Turning point - - - 52.30 53.32 51.85
95% confidence interval, Fieller method - - - [43.39 ; 59.06] [43.61 ; 63.64] [41.91 ; 60.66]
Observations 321 321 316 264 264 264
R-squared 0.324 0.332 0.372 0.529 0.539 0.553
Number of banks 40 40 39 34 34 34
Note: Constant included but not reported. Year fixed effects included. Robust standard
errors clustered at bank level are reported below their coefficient estimates. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Specification (1)
includes crisis dummy as control variable, specification (2) includes crisis dummy, inflation,
and GDP growth as control variables, while specification (3) includes all control variables.
Control variables are lagged one period. The Lerner index refers to the adjusted Lerner index
proposed by Koetter et al. (2012). The U-shape test is based on Lind and Mehlum (2010)
and the p-value of the test statistic is reported between square brackets. Ext. outside interval
means that the extremum point (i.e. the turning point) is outside the interval, then we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of a monotone relationship.
We also test the sensitivity of our results by considering three alternative
measures of the Lerner index and one alternative measure of market share. The
first alternative measure of the Lerner index uses a three-year moving average.
This measure aims to smooth the cyclical fluctuations of the Lerner index because
the market power of a bank is not likely to change radically in the short-run, as
argued by Leroy and Lucotte (2017). Second, we follow Maudos and de Guevara
(2007) and Turk-Ariss (2010) by re-estimating the translog cost function (equa-
tion 2) with funding costs excluded. It may be expected that banks with a high
level of market power, especially those with a high level of deposit market power,
are able to raise funds at a cheap cost. In this case, as Maudos and de Guevara
(2007) argue, including financial costs and consequently the price of deposits in
the cost function captures the effect of market power in banking and may bias the
results. By excluding funding costs, we are likely to get a clean proxy for pric-
ing power that is not distorted by deposit market power (Turk-Ariss, 2010). As
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before, the two-input cost function is estimated using an SFA, and we apply the
correction proposed by Koetter et al. (2012) to compute the funding-adjusted
Lerner index. In a very few cases values can be obtained empirically for the
Lerner index that are outside the 0 to 1 range. In our case, we have a total of
29 observations below zero, and no observations above one (see figure A7 and
table A2 in Appendix). Rather than treating these observations as outliers and
dropping them, we code them equal to zero, and then consider a left-censored
Lerner index. Finally, we use an alternative measure of market share that does
not only look at bank assets, but also considers deposit and loan market power.
This index is called global market share and is equal for each bank to the av-
erage of its market shares for assets, loans, and deposits. Correlations between
our different proxies for market power for each Baltic country are illustrated in
figure A9. The results are reported in tables 9 and 10. As previously, we only
report the coefficient estimates of our variables of interest. The results we obtain
confirm our previous findings.
Table 9: Market power and the Z-score: Results obtained with alternative proxies
for market power
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Dependent variable Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score
FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV
Lerner 1 7.152*** 9.565***
(1.534) (2.212)
Lerner 1*Lerner 1 -5.127*** -6.572***
(1.612) (2.472)
Lerner 2 5.370*** 15.213***
(1.210) (3.122)
Lerner 2*Lerner2 -4.759*** -12.774***
(1.456) (2.984)
Lerner 3 5.202*** 14.894***
(1.247) (3.194)
Lerner3*Lerner3 -4.478*** -12.323***
(1.473) (3.085)
Global Market share 0.078 0.133**
(0.060) (0.066)
Global Market share*Global market share -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
U-shape test 1.51 1.12 2.26 3.19 2.04 2.91 0.01 0.30
[0.069] [0.131] [0.014] [0.001] [0.024] [0.002] [0.494] [0.381]
Turning point 0.697 - 0.564 0.595 0.580 0.604 - -
95% confidence interval, Fieller method [0.561 ; 1.182] - [0.472 ; 0.865] [0.518 ; 0.725] [0.480 ; 0.964] [0.525 ; 0.755] - -
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 351 350 346 339 346 339 364 363
R-squared 0.444 0.497 0.451 0.218 0.448 0.228 0.375 0.381
Number of banks 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
Hansen J-OverID test [p-value] - 0.104 - 0.0927 - 0.108 - 0.256
Note: Constant included but not reported. Robust standard errors clustered at bank level
are reported below their coefficient estimates. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Specifications (1) and (2) includes all control variables.
Specification (1) is estimated using the FE estimator, while specification (2) is estimated using
the 2SLS estimator. Control variables are lagged one period. Lerner 1 corresponds to the
3-year moving average Lerner index, Lerner 2 to the funding-adjusted Lerner index, Lerner 3
to the left-censored Lerner index, and Global market share to the market share calculated by
considering assets, loans and deposits. The U-shape test is based on Lind and Mehlum (2010)
and the p-value of the test statistic is reported between square brackets.
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Table 10: Market power and loan loss reserves: Results obtained with alternative
proxies for market power(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Dependent variable Loan loss Loan loss Loan loss Loan loss Loan loss Loan loss Loan loss Loan loss
FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV
Lerner 1 -54.098*** -50.048***
(17.699) (12.095)
Lerner 1*Lerner 1 41.918*** 39.118***
(15.154) (11.808)
Lerner 2 -15.442** -51.876***
(7.522) (16.980)
Lerner 2*Lerner2 8.634 38.018**
(9.385) (16.209)
Lerner 3 -16.570** -51.129***
(7.892) (16.748)
Lerner3*Lerner3 9.712 37.320**
(9.466) (16.092)
Global Market share -1.018** -0.821***
(0.407) (0.194)
Global Market share*Global market share 0.010** 0.009***
(0.004) (0.002)
U-shape test 2.09 2.22 0.11 1.42 0.19 1.38 2.50 4.24
[0.021] [0.013] [0.456] [0.078] [0.424] [0.084] [0.008] [0.000]
Turning point 0.645 0.639 - 0.682 - 0.685 51.56 45.79
95% confidence interval, Fieller method [0.543 ; 0.927] [0.561 ; 0.871] - [0.568 ; 1.615] - [0.568 ; 1.721] [45.59 ; 56.99] [38.46 ; 51.86]
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 355 352 349 341 349 341 364 363
R-squared 0.645 0.684 0.543 0.271 0.546 0.301 0.606 0.638
Number of banks 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Hansen J-OverID test [p-value] - 0.202 - 0.168 - 0.156 - 0.0867
Note: Constant included but not reported. Robust standard errors clustered at bank level
are reported below their coefficient estimates. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Specifications (1) and (2) includes all control variables.
Specification (1) is estimated using the FE estimator, while specification (2) is estimated using
the 2SLS estimator. Control variables are lagged one period. Lerner 1 corresponds to the
3-year moving average Lerner index, Lerner 2 to the funding-adjusted Lerner index, Lerner 3
to the left-censored Lerner index, and Global market share to the market share calculated by
considering assets, loans and deposits. The U-shape test is based on Lind and Mehlum (2010)
and the p-value of the test statistic is reported between square brackets.
Third, we re-estimate our benchmark nonlinear specification (equation 6) by
considering a robust regression approach. The idea behind the robust regres-
sion is to down-weight the influence of high leverage data points and outliers to
provide a better fit of the data7. Our results, reported in table 11, confirm the
substance of the previous results. We find a very significant nonlinear relation-
ship between the Lerner index and our two proxies for bank risk, though this
relationship appears not to be statistically significant when we consider market
share and its squared term as right-hand side variables. This last result could
nonetheless easily be explained by the distribution of the market share series,
where there is consistently a large left tail (see figure A8), which implies that
7A robust regression is an alternative approach used when the data contain some outliers or
high leverage data points. It is a compromise between excluding these points entirely from the
analysis and including all the data points and treating them all equally in the regression. In
practice, robust regression works by assigning a weight to each data point. Weighting is done
automatically and iteratively using a process called iteratively reweighted least squares. In the
first iteration, each point is assigned an equal weight and model coefficients are estimated using
ordinary least squares (OLS). At subsequent iterations, weights are recomputed so that points
farther from the model predictions in the previous iteration are given a lower weight. The
model coefficients are then recomputed using weighted least squares. The process continues
until the values of the coefficient estimates converge within a specified tolerance.
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banks with a large market share are down-weighted.
Table 11: Market power and bank risk-taking: Results obtained using a robust
regression approach (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Z-score Z-score Z-score Loan loss Loan loss Loan loss
Lerner 6.293*** 6.251*** 6.308*** -7.279*** -6.954*** -9.560***
(0.754) (0.762) (0.714) (1.571) (1.535) (1.532)
Lerner*Lerner -5.780*** -5.709*** -5.888*** 4.667** 4.183** 6.717***
(0.854) (0.872) (0.822) (1.811) (1.785) (1.790)
U-shape test 5.00 4.77 5.33 0.84 0.56 1.65
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.2] [0.289] [0.049]
Turning point 0.544 0.547 0.535 - - 0.711
95% confidence interval, Fieller method [0.494 ; 0.618] [0.495 ; 0.627] [0.488 ; 0.604] - - [0.587 ; 1.071]
Observations 350 350 346 349 349 349
R-squared 0.442 0.443 0.520 0.650 0.660 0.713
Dependent variable Z-score Z-score Z-score Loan loss Loan loss Loan loss
Market share 0.008 0.007 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.079**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.039)
Market share*Market share 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
U-shape test Ext. outside Ext. outside 0.04 Ext. outside Ext. outside 0.93
interval interval [0.483] interval interval [0.176]
Turning point - - - - - -
95% confidence interval, Fieller method - - - - - -
Observations 370 370 366 368 368 368
R-squared 0.320 0.324 0.423 0.581 0.575 0.573
Note: Constant included but not reported. Year fixed effects included. Standard errors are
reported below their coefficient estimates. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Specification (1) includes crisis dummy as control variable,
specification (2) includes crisis dummy, inflation, and GDP growth as control variables, while
specification (3) includes all control variables. Control variables are lagged one period. The
Lerner index refers to the adjusted Lerner index proposed by Koetter et al. (2012). The U-
shape test is based on Lind and Mehlum (2010) and the p-value of the test statistic is reported
between square brackets. Ext. outside interval means that the extremum point (i.e. the
turning point) is outside the interval, then we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a monotone
relationship.
Finally, we investigate whether our results evolve when the same regression
(equation 6) includes our two proxies for bank competition, which are the Lerner
index and market share. As argued by Carbó et al. (2009), structural and non-
structural measures of competition tend to measure different things, and so they
can be viewed as complementary proxies for competition. This is confirmed by
the relatively low degree of correlation between the Lerner index and the market
share for the Baltic countries (see figure 2). The results that we obtain when we
consider the Lerner index, market share, and their squared terms in the same
regression are reported in table 12. As is apparent, we still find a U-shaped
relationship between bank competition and financial stability.
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Table 12: Market power and bank risk-taking: Results obtained with two proxies
for competition in the same regression(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Z-score Z-score Z-score Loan loss Loan loss Loan loss
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Lerner 4.719*** 4.742*** 4.883*** -17.486** -17.898** -17.667**
(1.139) (1.167) (1.213) (6.639) (6.808) (6.513)
Lerner*Lerner -3.898*** -3.970*** -4.144*** 13.612* 14.713* 14.727*
(1.273) (1.330) (1.435) (8.003) (8.194) (8.297)
Market share 0.034 0.033 0.071 -1.633*** -1.588*** -1.551***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.582) (0.573) (0.486)
Market share*Market share -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.016** 0.015** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
U-shape test (Lerner) 1.97 1.93 1.88 0.95 1.11 1.07
[0.027] [0.030] [0.034] [0.174] [0.137] [0.146]
Turning point (Lerner) 0.605 0.597 0.589 - - -
95% confidence interval, Fieller method (Lerner) [0.497 ; 0.995] [0.485 ; 1.021] [0.477 ; 1.067] - - -
U-shape test (Market share) Ext. outside Ext. outside Ext. outside 2.60 2.52 2.82
interval interval interval [0.006] [0.008] [0.003]
Turning point (Market share) - - - 50.67 51.50 51.44
95% confidence interval, Fieller method (Market share) - - - [45.99 ; 60.21] [46.07 ; 63.65] [46.14 ; 61.73]
Observations 350 350 346 349 349 349
R-squared 0.435 0.436 0.457 0.646 0.656 0.665
Number of banks 40 40 39 38 38 38
Note: Constant included but not reported. Year fixed effects included. Robust standard
errors clustered at bank level are reported below their coefficient estimates. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Specification (1)
includes crisis dummy as control variable, specification (2) includes crisis dummy, inflation,
and GDP growth as control variables, while specification (3) includes all control variables.
Control variables are lagged one period. The Lerner index refers to the adjusted Lerner index
proposed by Koetter et al. (2012). The U-shape test is based on Lind and Mehlum (2010)
and the p-value of the test statistic is reported between square brackets. Ext. outside interval
means that the extremum point (i.e. the turning point) is outside the interval, then we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of a monotone relationship.
6 Conclusion
This paper is the first attempt to assess empirically the relationship between
banking competition and financial stability in the Baltic countries. We do this
using bank-level data and consider two alternative proxies for competition, the
Lerner index and market share, with the Z-score and loan loss reserves as com-
plementary measures of bank risk. We take a sample of 40 commercial banks in
Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia in 2000-2014, and our empirical results highlight
an inverse and robust U-shaped relationship between the Lerner index and the
Z-score, and a statistically significant U-shaped relationship between the Lerner
index, market share and the loan loss reserves ratio. This means that a higher
degree of market power arising from the low level of competition is associated
with a decrease in risk-taking by banks and in the risk of insolvency for the banks
up to a certain threshold, after which the relationship between competition and
banking sector stability turns negative. We find that the optimal threshold for
the Lerner index is 0.606 on average, and 49% is optimal for market share. The
upper and lower values for the 95% confidence intervals are 0.508 and 0.873 for
the Lerner index, and 39.46% and 55.41% for the market share.
The policy implications are that such a threshold implies that how the struc-
ture of the banking industry evolves is of critical importance for financial stability.
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This suggests that the policy-makers in charge of monitoring and regulating the
banking industry should place greater emphasis on mergers and acquisitions, by
encouraging them when competition is fierce, while preventing them in contrast
in highly concentrated banking markets, at least for the largest banks.
This issue is especially important for the Baltic countries, which have a rel-
atively high degree of concentration in the banking sector. As the low degree of
correlation between the Lerner index and market share seems to suggest, per-
mitting financial institutions to become larger might not necessarily lead to a
lower degree of competition, but larger institutions might be encouraged to take
more risk with their portfolios. Whatever the reason for financial institutions
increasing risk, whether they are compensating for their improved diversification
or exploiting their status as too big to fail, more attention should be devoted to
the issue of the optimal size for them.
27
Appendix
Table A1: Overview of bank-level analyses on the effect of bank competition on
financial stability
Paper Study area Competition measure(s) Dependent variable(s) Effect of competition on financial stability
Agoraki et al. (2011) CEECs Lerner index Z-score, Nonperforming loans (NPL) Negative
Almarzoqi et al. (2015) MENA Lerner index Z-score, NPL Negative
Amidu and Wolfe (2013) Emerging countries Lerner index Z-score, NPL, Capitalization ratio Positive
Anginer et al. (2014) Mixed Lerner index Systemic risk measures Positive
Baselga-Pascual et al. (2015) Euro area Industry concentration Z-score, NPL Negative
Beck et al. (2013) Mixed Lerner index Z-score Negative
Berger et al. (2009) Industrialised countries Lerner, Industry concentration Z-score, NPL, Capitalization ratio Non-linear
Buch et al. (2013) Germany Lerner index Measure of bank distress Negative
Craig and Dinger (2013) USA Deposit market competition NPL, ROA volatility, Stock price volatility Positive
Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) 5 EU countries Lerner index Z-score Positive
Forssbaeck and Shehzad (2015) Mixed Lerner index Z-score Negative
Fu et al. (2014) Asia Pacific Lerner, Industry concentration Z-score, Probability of bankruptcy Ambiguous
Fungáčová and Weill (2013) Russia Lerner index Bank failure Negative
IJtsma et al. (2017) 25 EU countries Industry concentration Z-score Positive
Jeon and Lim (2013) Korea Boone index, Industry concentration Z-score Non-linear
Jimenez et al. (2013) Spain Industry concentration NPL Non-linear
Kasman and Kasman (2015) Turkey Lerner, Boone Z-score, NPL Non-linear
Kick and Prieto (2015) Germany Market share, Lerner, Boone Bank distress, Bank default Ambiguous
Kouki and Al-Nasser (2017) Africa Lerner index Z-score Negative
Leroy and Lucotte (2017) Europe Lerner index Z-score, Distance-to-default (DD), SRISK Negative: Z-score & DD, Positive: SRISK
Liu and Wilson (2013) Japan Lerner index Z-score Non-linear
Liu et al. (2013) 10 EU countries Lerner index Z-score Non-linear
Mirzaei et al. (2013) Mixed Bank market share, Industry concentration Z-score Ambiguous
Saadaoui (2014) Emerging countries Lerner index NPL Negative
Schaeck and Čihák (2014) 10 EU countries Boone index Z-score Positive
Soedarmono et al. (2011) Asia Lerner index Z-score Positive
Soedarmono et al. (2013) Asia Lerner index Z-score Positive
Tabak et al. (2012) Latin America Boone index Measure of "stability efficiency" Non-linear
Tabak et al. (2013) Latin America Industry concentration Measure of "stability efficiency" Positive
Tabak et al. (2015) Brazil H-statistic Z-score, NPL Negative
Turk-Ariss (2010) Developing countries Lerner index Z-score, Risk-adjusted rates of return Negative
Table A2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Lerner index 401 0.48 0.29 -0.05 0.97
3-year MA Lerner index 421 0.49 0.25 -0.05 0.96
Funding-adjusted Lerner index 401 0.48 0.28 0.00 0.97
Left-censored Lerner index 401 0.49 0.28 0.00 0.97
Market share 410 10.93 16.03 0.00 80.72
Global market share 400 11.21 16.14 0.06 80.36
Z-score 370 2.74 1.50 -2.99 7.27
ZROE 321 1.39 1.41 -4.27 6.86
Loan loss reserves 390 5.69 8.30 0.00 78.97
Impaired loans 273 13.04 15.34 0.07 89.05
Size 410 13.52 1.79 6.65 17.45
Non-interest income/total income 410 0.45 0.24 -0.67 2.73
Fixed assets/total assets 410 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.39
Loans/total assets 404 0.55 0.22 0.00 0.96
Liquidity 410 40.08 25.02 0.64 168.79
Annual inflation rate 600 3.79 3.57 -1.15 15.43
Annual GDP growth rate 600 4.24 6.39 -14.81 11.90
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Table A3: Correlation matrix of bank-level variables
var1 var2 var3 var4 var5 var6 var7
Lerner (var1) 1
Market share (var2) 0.1671* 1
Size (var3) 0.0674 0.6271* 1
Non-interest income/total income (var 4) -0.1654* -0.1098* -0.1529* 1
Fixed assets/total assets (var 5) -0.0960 -0.0982* -0.4610* 0.2992* 1
Loans/total assets (var6) 0.1006* 0.3239* 0.4353* -0.4343* -0.1720* 1
Liquidity (var7) 0.0529 -0.2554* -0.4303* 0.3233* 0.2119* -0.8161* 1
Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
Table A4: Definition and source of variables
Variable Definition
Dependent variables
Z-score Accounting bank-level measure of individual bank risk. A larger value indicates a higher bank stability and less
bank risk-taking. Source: Authors’ calculations, Bankscope
ZROE Return-on-equity based Z-score measure. A larger value indicates a higher bank stability and less bank risk-taking.
Source: Authors’ calculations, Bankscope
Loan loss reserves Ratio indicating how much of the total portfolio of a bank has been provided for but not charged off.
It is a reserve for losses expressed as percentage of total loans. Given a similar charge-off policy the higher the ratio
the poorer the quality of the loan portfolio is. Source: Bankscope
Impaired loans Impaired loans (or non-performing loans) are loans that are unlikely to be paid back for the full amount.
The impaired loans to gross loans ratio is used to measure bank’s asset risk. Source: Bankscope
Explanatory variables
Lerner index A bank-level measure of bank market power following the methodology proposed by Koetter et al. (2012). A higher value
indicates more market power and less bank competition. Source: Authors’ calculations, Bankscope
3-year MA Lerner index A 3-year rolling time window is used to compute the Lerner index. A higher value indicates more market
power and less bank competition. Source: Authors’ calculations, Bankscope
Funding-adjusted Lerner index Following Maudos and de Guevara (2007), a two-input cost function is considered to estimate the translog cost
function. A higher value of the funding-adjusted Lerner index indicates more market power and less bank competition.
Source: Authors’ calculations, Bankscope
Left-censored Lerner index Negative values of the Lerner index are truncated to zero. A higher value of the left-censored Lerner
index indicates more market power and less bank competition. Source: Authors’ calculations, Bankscope
Bank size The log value of total assets. Source: BankScope
Non-interest income / Total income A bank-level measure of business diversification. Source: Bankscope
Fixed assets / Total assets A bank-level measure of asset composition. Source: Bankscope
Liquidity A bank-level liquidity indicator, which corresponds to the ratio of liquid assets over deposits and
short term funding. A higher value indicates less liquidity risk. Source: Bankscope
Loans / Total assets A bank-level measure of asset composition. Source: Bankscope
GDP growth Annual real GDP growth. Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank
Inflation Annual percentage change of consumer prices index. Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank
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Figure A5: Conditional marginal effects
Note: The conditional marginal effects are computed by considering our benchmark non-
linear specification estimated using the fixed effects (FE) estimator, i.e. the specification (3)
in table 4 for the Lerner index, and the specification (3) in table 7 for the market share. The
Lerner index refers to the adjusted Lerner index proposed by Koetter et al. (2012). The grey
lines correspond to the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure A6: Average turning points and situation of banks in Baltic countries
Note: The average turning point for the Lerner index and the market share is calculated by
considering results obtained with our benchmark nonlinear specification, i.e. results reported
in tables 4, 5, 6 and 7. Also note that we only consider the specifications for which the U-
shape test indicates a p-value below 0.05. The average "optimal" threshold for the Lerner
index is equal to 0.606, and to 49% for the market share. The Lerner index refers to the
adjusted Lerner index proposed by Koetter et al. (2012). The red dash line corresponds to
the 95% confidence interval for the Lerner index, while the blue dash line corresponds to the
95% confidence interval for the market share. More precisely, the confidence intervals reported
in this graph correspond to the average of the upper and lower confidence bounds calculated
by considering all specifications for which the U-shape test indicates a non-linear relationship
statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Figure A7: Histogram and kernel density plot of the Lerner index
Note: The Lerner index refers to the adjusted Lerner index proposed by Koetter et al.
(2012).
Figure A8: Histogram and kernel density plot of the market share
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Figure A9: Correlation between alternative measures of market power for each
Baltic country
Note: EE: Estonia; LT: Lithuania; LV: Latvia. Lerner refers to the adjusted Lerner index
proposed by Koetter et al. (2012), Lerner 1 to the 3-year moving average Lerner index, Lerner 2
to the funding-adjusted Lerner index, Lerner 3 to the left-censored Lerner index, Market share
to the market share based on assets, and global market share to the market share calculated
by considering assets, loans and deposits.
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